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fundamental police power of 
What is a utility? Webster's 
quality of being useful" or, more 
such as gas, electricity, water, or 
also "a public service company." 
defining what is a "public service." 






, 's is no 
or 
what is not, is ultimately a 
Reasonably, a public service is a service to which the public 
must have access, a service with which individuals and society 
cannot do without. 
But some services once thought to unques public 
are now being provided on a private is. The causes are 
complex. Frequently cited as a driving is 
technological change. In most cases, however, 
moot. Policy incentives -- deregulation, tax 1 
preemption of local jurisdiction -- create bus ss ties 
for nonutility companies to compete with lities. Technology 
is then deployed to exploit these opportunities. 
In many cases, the competitive 
well. With each smaller customer, 
declines. The utilities claim that 
plans to provide universal service, many 
suggesting that the services they provide are 
public. 
In response, utilities are 
igations to serve all without di 
idiaries, which operate beyond 
icates regulators' j and creates new risks for 
associated utilities. In other states (though not 
fornia), utilities are seeking to 





lower for large customers with access to competitive ); 
and to deaverage rates among large and small, urban and rural, 
users. Recently, the Illinois Legis ssed legislation to 
deregulate that state's telephone industry 1992. 
lA 
Competitors compla 
utilities to unfairly 
In the midst 
whether large or 
The consumer is 
regulation/deregulation/~~~~.~ 
place in admini 
the enemy of business 




State policy must 
Regulatory reform i 
clear understanding 
utility regulation 





, most of which takes 
courts. Uncertainty is 
are probably substantial 
• Individuals also 
t resort" 





The General Issue: The Utility Obligation to Serve 
The California Cons 
of certain specified goods 
















s investor-owned providers 
s -- light, heat, water, 













The 1 understanding the 
util prepared to 
service to anyone who can pay , 's t 
("public"}. This implies vertical integration to ensure control 
over production and distribution, and long-range planning to 
avoid shortages. 
reciprocal obligation of 
a price for service that includes 
of the utility's "preparedness to 
price has tended to be an average , 
service is provided through an integrated 
customers. 
over the past ten years, the understanding 
these obligations has undergone profound change. 
Energy Service 
In the energy field, the 
periodic shortages of natural 
that certain customers ("low-priori 
do without utility service by 
self-generation capability. State 
established "curtailment priorities," 
customers who will lose service 
s attempted to 1 
supply any way they 
to cost. As prices rose, 




s entai bringing new capita 
industries, in the form of higher allowed the 
to 
existing utilities and 










facing rising prices, are 





The experience of 
demand-management 
investments of 
to propose a new 
11participant" a 
attempt to transact 
4 
to attract new entrants. 
Act (PURPA) created a 
requiring 
(QF's) compete with 
to the 1 grid, 
to a retail 
electric generators 
rd party 
with curtailment and 

























cost, which meant that addit 1 cus 
of their initial con~ection. As 
as few as 30 of all Americans 
In 1934, the Communications Act 
functions to the Federal Communications 
reiterated the responsibilities of state 
with regard to 1ntrastate service. 
series of schemes to adjusted rates 
cheapening the price of local at 
long-distance customers. Additionally, 
money to subsidize small private and cooperative 
companies in rural areas. 
For 25 years, this system worked 1, so 
percent of all Americans became telephone customers. 
1950's saw the beginning of an assault on the te 
by large customers, including the government, 
cutting their telecommunications expenses. In 1957, 
newspapers, manufacturers, retailers, 
through their associations and law 
sue the "Above 890" decision, opening 
competitive supply. A series of 
the succeeding three decades, culminating 
by AT&T of its local telephone companies. 
As a result, telephone equipment, local 
long-distance service are "unbund " -- customers 
separately. In California, as in most states, 
equipment are unregulated; local service is 
long-distance service exists a limbo 
nonregulation. The monopoly franchise 
the LATA's, or local service areas, 
(There are 11 local service areas 
local telephone companies continue to 
on a regulated basis. 
on 
90 
For these local connections, are 
access charges (nearly $2 
stance carriers and their customers. new 
ranging from special radio transmiss services to 
networks to cable television, sh to enter market, 
larly the lucrative business. 
Additionally, long-distance carriers are now capable, as a 
re t of recent FCC hearings, of 1 directly to 
customers. Together, the local 
companies, and their customers 
5A 
1 
companies and avoid paying access 
companies claim that if 
defray the cost of basic 
They seek to exclude 
their revenues, they 
are few 
Many competitors argue 
small and select 
will not economically serve. 
agree with phone 
offer better prices for 




charges. The local telephone 
occurs, they cannot 
access charges. 
, to bolster 
whi 
unique services to a 
companies cannot and 
hand, large customers 
companies would 
, the threat of 
case, phone 
PUC President Don Vial has called this "regulatory 
blackmail." Nevertheless, the PUC, in 1985, began shifting 
between $900 million and $2.5 11 telephone company 
charges from the long-distance carriers and their customers to 
local telephone customers, through a ly rising surcharge. 
The FCC is doing same customer , due 
to rise to $2 per month and 
steady at $6 per line per 
All of this tumult 
telecommunications ut 
indispensable to the 
universal basis: 
through the competitive 
regulated 1 to 
telecommunications 
some of , 
should every customer 
just what is a 
are absolutely 
ly on a 
, to be provided 
is it for 
What of those who cannot use some services 
benefit by 1 ty 
computer-communications 






In early 1990's, 








s can be separate 
long-distance carriers, 
all must be interconnected at some 
to provide the service be parce out 
1 ratepayers? Only those who use 
11 most rapidly use ISDN? These 
hypothetical: Pacific Bell's 
"Project Victoria," in Danville, 
The FCC's Computer lf! inqui , to 
low te companies to reenter 
precluded earlier FCC and court 
of all varieties 
to take advantage of 
opportunity for market share. 
Increasingly, as telephone 
edge toward provision of 
or through subsidiaries, 
about the distribution 
customers pay telephone companies 
are making these calls for the 
future, the telephone companies 
available access to sophisticated 
entertainment, governance, and commerce. 
11 this function in a 
future electronical 
a public service -- "a service to 
access, a service which 
thout" -- they may have to create 
entities, "information utilities." 
were 
Among the issues of interest to the Committee are the 
following: 
is the 
e Does the to serve extend to all forms of 
f some conventionally defined level or 
? 
• Should the obl 
new customers? 
be different as between existing and 
e What is the 
the obligation 
service from a 
right to demand 
relationship between the monopoly franchise 
to serve? Does a customer's decis to take 
's competitor t in a forfeiture of 
service? 
• What is the obligation of a utility to be prepared to 
render service? 
• What equities are involved in current customers paying for 
readiness to serve future customers, or paying to rna 
ities to customers? 
• 
utility service 
certain portions of 
o How can it 




of technological improvements to 
the long- or short-term, 
customer ? 
properly a utility 
, not now provided 
? 
? 
ld, what is the regulated 
definition of 










have emerged from a 
and regulatory environment. 
abate as increasing competitive pressures force 
philosophies and consider 
sector of the American economy 
two major changes in its environment 
in over a decade. The first change began in the late 
1960s. It occurred because of the development of a 
of significant portions of the 
sector. The issues and problems are 
numerous and complex . 
sector was in a 
"'m""'"''"''v"' environment. Economic growth was un-
inflation rates, as as interest 
rates, were low. Utilities could construct, and fi-
Cha!rieG~ F. Phillips, .Jr., is the Rob-
ert G. Brown Professor of Econom-
ICS at Wash1ngton and Lee Untversity 
He president ol the Institute lor 
Study Regulation Over the past two 
dee<:.1es. he has testified on rate of 
or rate structure in over 00 
utility cases before federal and 
state regulatory commissions. Smce 
1971 he has served as mayor ot the 
c1ty of Lex1ngton. V1rg1n1a Dr. Phil· 
Ups rece1ved an AB degree from the 
University of New Hampshire and a 
PhD degree from Harvard Un1versity 
He !he author of "The Regulat1on 
of Public Utilit1es · ( 984) 







The electric power industry was 
of its technological destiny; for ae1:ao1es, 
mr1mi~nt manufacturers for tech-
important, technologi-
(2) The Federal 
Power Commission's price regulation held nat-
well below the competitive level, thereby 
consumption but. discouraging exploration 
and development, and contributing to the natural gas 
From the point of view of the regulatory commis-
sions, annual appropriations were too small (particu-
larly at the state level) to permit adequate staffs, both 
in terms of number and of composition. The regulatory 
process was oriented toward the past - e.g., past or 
historic test years, embedded or fully distributed cost 
pricing methodology - and for periodic rate reduc-
tions; some state commissioners, as already noted, were 
only part-time. Regulatory lag became a serious prob-
lem just at a time when public utilities found it essen-
tial to and the commissions to grant, larger 
and annual rate increases. Old issues were re-
vived e.g., deposit and termination policies - new 
issues were raised; e.g., curtailment priorities, con-
servation programs. The emphasis in rate cases shifted 
revenue requirements to rate design and, in 
tum, from embedded costs to marginal or incremental 
costs. As the planning period nearly doubled for elec-
tric utilities, construction work in progress became a 
crucial issue; as cutbacks occurred, so did the treatment 
of plant abandonment. The entire regulatory process 
became "highly adversarial, as well as analytically 
demanding. "9 
Some Implications: The impact of this new environ-
ment can only be described as enormous - on both 
the regulated and the regulator. Rate increase cases pro-
liferated, and soon resulted in a growing burden on 
and commission staffs. Marketing departments 
many electric firms) were abolished; planning de-
were created. Indeed, many utilities made sub-
stantial reorganizations - on occasion, resulting from 
management audits (the rage of the 1970s}. Utilities 
and their investors found that earnings could fluctuate 
upward and downward, and that annual dividend 
increases were no longer "guaranteed." (Dividends, in 
were no longer a certainty, as Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc.'s stockholders learned in 
April, 1974.) The public's perception of utilities changed 
radically, and utilities tried several different approaches 
----
consumer confidence throughout the decade. 
Regulation by the Federal Power Commissicm, by Ste-
cmd Paul W. Mac.Avoy, The Brookings Institution, 
C., 1974, especially Chap 3. 
9Perry, op cit. 
JANUARY 9. 1986-PUBUC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 
ties 
tive 
But above all 
the 
commissioners is the most 
painful adaptation to an environment 
comfortable, and has now oec:orr1e 
evidence, the fact 
and in 
employed full-time staff members 
55 per cent) and spent 5268 million 
per 
Turning 
self, ~any ,.tt,, ..... ,ntt:: were made to shorten the process; 
e.g., canned testimony, p:rehearing rn,nf"'"'""'"'~~""'~· 
WSee "A Hi~>h-n<.l< 
23, 1981, pp. 
of the power con~panies 
to mind sad 
of once called itself 
p. 162. 
n "The Xe~:ulatea 
Avoy, 
also ''The Decline of Service in 
S. Carron and Paul W. MacAvoy, 
Washington, D. C., 1981. 
cit. 
Regulation of Pw/ic Charles F. 
Andrew 
Jr., Public Utilities Reports, Inc., Arlington, Virginia, 1984, pp. 
125. 




short: "Questions that once were 
by airlines 
determine the 
discounted fares is 
1982, 77 per cent 
on discount fares. This 
19tH, and 46 per cent in 
EJ<:cwriPn•c" U. S Airline In-
Re:~lati<>n i.n Gas Indus-
UTILITIES foRTNIGHTI Y 
15, 17, 
27"The Telecommunications M. 




Rule Satisfies on T "'"""""'" ,.,,,, 
Inside F.E.R.C., October 
When Not to 
its rates."31 
and its tone, the 
are instructive: 
In our view, <>t-l·"""t'"'" competition does not mean 
or that more than one 
each market. believe the 
check on a 
were the case, one 
to find an example of effective competition 
•ruu ...... , in the economy. In any event, the consum-
are not 
benefits from the raf'.ge 
New 





a'rt"""'""a compe~itive environment will re-
ur••,.t•»" flexibility (the new buzzword the 
years. Almost every critic of 
economic regulation has noted rigidity of tradi-
tional as compared with competition; a ri-
gidity, in part, dictated by the necessity of satisfying 
the requirements of due process. Can any reader imag-
ine competitive enterprises such as International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation, General Motors Corpora-
tion, Safeway Stores, Inc., or Kroger Company having 
to wait just over nine months to change their prices? 
Competition has no respect for precedent and the tradi-
tional regulatory process. 
FERC Chairman O'Connor, in a recent article, put it 
this way: 
Another problem with traditional rate making has 
been its inflexibility. As burner-tip competition grows, 
gas will have to be marketed more vigorously with 
prices more responsive to the volatility of alternate 
fuel prices. One way to provide this flexibility is by 
setting levels based on full cost allocation while 
permitting lower rates to be charged. Another possi-
bility is the use of a range of allowable prices -
what might be called zone of reasonableness pridng.36 
The need for greater flexibility where regulation is 
relaxed is obvious, with the commissions undoubtedly 
a monitoring function, as noted earlier. 
Where regulation must be maintained, the new environ-
ment suggests a change in its focus, as well as greater 
flexibility. New procedures and long-term planning are 
despite the fact that existing economic, politi-
social pressures make it difficult to avoid 
formal proceedings and short-run expediency. 
Many suggestions were mentioned previously. 
Other institutional also must be re-
Take just one example - regional regula-
tion. At least two state regulators (one former and one 
have urged regulation for the electric 
telephone industries. With respect to the electric 
industry, former National Association of Regulatory Util-
351! must be noted that there may well be significant and bona fide 
over such issues as timing. But there will be no major 
if the attitude is one that the policy is 
a !he decision is to do nothing until reregulation 
sometime in the future. · 
l<I()'Connor, op cit, p. 16. 




governing the financing, ,..,. .. .,. . ,.,,,".''""' 
to one new plant, transmission 
one 
With to the 
Burke of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commissi< 
has stated: 
case ,,.,,uuun•a 




environment. Its time 
While we may 
culties, regional 
n.erq;u1;m•:m of the Electric 
of NYNEX in order to 
our new telecommunicatio 
come.311 
at the 
}. Wallace, 110 
13, 25, 1952. 
38Edward F. Burke, as quoted in NARUC Bulletin, No. 8-19! 





~ PROPOSES DEREXIDLATING IDCAL PHONE 
FCC Chrnn. Fowler made perhaps IOOSt l"lrJ~m.:::•'~'" 
area Wed. ~ calling for national 
, including 
not policies being cor.sidered ~,-,..~ 
nuch regulation on teleccmmmications , 
Fowler's call for lifting of nuch of regulation in brc::>acica.s 
In speech at Camlunication Networks ' 
following news briefing, Fowler provided sane 
on how regulatory scheme ~d work. He roore details will 
article to be published in June in Federal Ccmnunications Bar Assn. Journal. 
Fowler said his m:xlel for deregulation .. '"' ............. 
open architecture environment in which service e..1..•:::::u~~:::J:H •• e 
unbundled basis. After that has been aea"Ueved, 
teleccmmmications services 
and rates." Deregulation would cover "access, 
facilities. " Open architecture-based system 
magic of canpeti tion into the market, " he said, 
econanic nechanism for maintaining universal service. 
would be allowed to provide local exchange service, Fowler 
"hard to predict" but said cable industry could to ca:rpete 
and 
He declined to provide details on local franchise and re;pe>nsl.b:JLil 
of telcos, saying plan would be presented in fuller fashion in 
article. 
Fowler's program is based on prani.se that regulation as known today is 
essentially 19th century concept applied to industry apprc::>aching 21st century. 
of teleccmmmications, at state federal level, cost count.r.J 
..., ............... "" •. '"' and billions of dollars lost OPJPQl:tUnitiE;s 
productivity gains for the eCOI1Cll'!Y in the hundreds 
'-"'-'""'"'"~""'"'""'"' that "public utility rrodel not 
never have been applied lock, stock to field of 
teleccmmmications. It's because the PUC approach forgets to consider 
ccmpetition, regardless of the facts." 
Fowler said glin:mar of canpetition been 
sacrosanct local telephone market" through digital systems, 
cellular, cable and other services: "As ccmpetitive choices increase the 
.......... ....u .... :market, carriers will have to price their at cost, in1pi:ove 
service, offer choices - or lose cust.a'oors. Regulators nust let them try. " 
'Ib ensure that universal service levels are 
subsidy program. As general 
ext.eild.Ed not only to users of lifeline 
consurrers high cost areas . " 
to be asked. First, PUC (or other gove...."1"lme11tal 
"""'•=-'~"'~"'"".,... .... """ ....... .._ rates will be regulated. so, PUC state 
to keep tele};lhone penetration at acceptable level-recognized 
"close on 
....... ,~-'-"'"',.. """""'""""!..Q.I. ... ~.. resolution are a nust. u 
plan ...,.;ould be 
'-..L".IUClL..I.. debate f 
no:001oct this p~:x:p:~arn 
the decade. 
Fowler and Cal:lmon 
plan would 
aeJ:>at:e, while divestiture essentially was 
+-tv,,+- rwch participation. 
would announce that deregulatory 
open architecture 
"''-"'....._'""' be ii11:>le!l'!eJnt.E'Ki 






e:>nl"ir.'n~ Assn. Pres. John """""""'"'"''"""""'· .... 
forward in recognizing 
while Nynex spokesman .... Q.J..J.o:::u. 
said it's in Nynex's 
on network as possible. 
cons\ll'lers need now rrore ~= ... 
phone service - not less, " was reaction 
of House Telecan SUb::x::rmU. ttee. "We do not another 
action, which goes too far too fast, particularly 'When it ca:res to 
consumers are paying for local service. We need :te::lei~al. ull'ltc>rs to adopt a 
go-slow policy that avoids any :rrore shocks to the 
Eugene Ki.Imtelman, legislative dir. of Consumer H'..:.."!o .. -::.+-
"This is the deregulation ideologue at his best. " He 
deregulation of local service, in 'Which there isn canpe~ti 
put costs of providing service at $35 per subscriber, pn~ssurE~s ,,nr~,.,... 
deregulation would be great for local increases, . L\..Lin•~~:•..u."I:U 
addition, he said subsidy program sugg-ested by Fowler creation 
of "an entirely new bureaucracy for welfare. 1hat' s strange for the Feagan 
Administration to be proposing." 

• 
emise of the Telephone 
By ALFRED W. DUERIG 
reveals some of the costs and inefficiencies which are a public 
twin occurrences of deregulation in the telecommunications and judicially 
breakup of the formerly unified Bell system network. The 
steps that can be taken to assure maximum benefits for the telephone-using public, 
given the accomplished facts of divestiture and competition. 
The unified nationwide telecommunications 
network - those hundreds of millions of miles of inter-
circuits and the thousands of switching machines 
lnl·«>r•·nruH>ri11nc them - isn't what it used to be. It is 
perhaps not an exaggeration to speak of its demise. The 
loss has been a costly one, both in terms of money and 
service. It is the purpose of this article to explain these 
statements, to give illustrations of the points at issue 
from the viewpoint of a telecommunications network 
engineer, and to speculate on what the future of the 
network might be. 
30 
There were two distinct events which have led to the 
of the unified network, and we shall review 
They are (1) the introduction of com-
into network provisioning, a gradual process 
Alfred W. D~ was employed by 
the Bell Telephone Company of Penn-
sylvania for thirty-seven years, during 
the last sevent.:.en of which he was 
general engineering manager. In this 
capacity, he was 1n charge of network 
eng1neering lor Pennsylvania and Del-
aware He is a reg1stered professional 
engine<·' m Pennsylvania, and also a 
sen1or member of the Institute ot Elec-
trical and Electronics Eng1neers. Mr. 
D~~erle holds a BS degree m electri-
cal engineering from the University of 
Pennsylvania 
over a 15-year period, (2) the systeml divesti-
ture, which went into effect on January 1, 1984. 
Network Competition - Historical BaclftJtOI!llltd 
For most of the life of the telecommunications indus-
try, the network over which calls are transmitted has 
been regarded as a natural monopoly. This 
was espoused by Theodore Vail, generally considered 
to be the founding father of the Bell system, in 1907.2 
It was affirmed by the United States in the 
Communications Act of 1934, and in the 
1956 Consent Decree which terminated Department 
of Justice's 1949 antitrust action against the Bell system. 
The first break in this thinking occurred with the 
1959 "Above 890" ruling by the 
tions Commission, which allowed to 
use available of the frequency spectrum above 
890 megahertz for their own communications. Tnis in 
itself was relatjvely ineffective since most companies 
found that continuing to use the Bell system their 
communications needs was less costly and more reliable 
than constructing maintaining their own nPinN•r.r~.:: 
Then, in August of 1969, the FCC authorized a com-
1Although the terms "Bell system" and "AT&tT" were inter-
changeable during the long period of unified we 
will here use the former term to refer to the sv>tem 
operation and the latter to designate the postdivestiture AT&tT co~pany 
2American Telephone and Telegraph Company annual report for 
1907. 
3Defendant's Exhibit No. D-17-13 in U.S. versus AT&tT 
internal General Electric memorandum: "The 
can provide communication al a lower cost than 
Electric or any special service carrier can." 






zations. Based on his work, we can summarize some 
basic of public utility economics: 
Competition in public 
and must be 
of "the greatest 
.,,....,,..,.., ... rather than on costs for 
services. 
util-
Under these general principles the telt~comiJnU!:tic;al:i~lns 
led the 
and virtually universal service in the 
States (over 95 per cent of homes with 
"'"''F1AJ''"'r"' was considered a 
As von Auw has 
Exchange telephone service and service 
have an even more claim to being natural mo-
''"' .... '"''"·"' than does the of water gas. That 
II 
A simple anal-
running 20 trains 
with running the 
routes. In the latter 
Figure 1 
Economy of Scale 
way, signals, 
Microwave Radio Relay Route 
A) Structural Requirements (per route regardless of size) 
Transmitters 
Receivers 
A route will have costs of A + B. 
Two routes will have costs of 2A + 8 
matter what the values of A and B, the latter costs more. 
areas such as New York city around 
The invention of cable and the 
telephone plant solved 
growth to continue. To-
Communication Services 
to their customers at 
AT&T's. How is this uu''""""' 
8"Therefore, Be Bold," by Barry Stavro, Forbes 
ber 23, 1985. 
PUBLIC FORTNIGHTLY -JANUARY 23 
to enter the exchange tele-
distance offset the 
the economic waste 
an increase in long-
the 
time the Illinois Commerce 
interests have appeared with dear in-
··~·~c.~...:~;~n in those 
order to 
for the household users across 
Such competition may be those 
interest entities which are not at averse to com-
peting with a regulated system. But it is not in 
my opinion, for the American the 
part which is disadvantaged the unfortunate. 
Nationwide Price A verliifll"'l 
Rates for intercity lines message telephone 
service have long set on a basis of nationwide 
This is an of the "value of ser-
vice" concept, which long governed Bell system rate 
setting. Value of service means that a customer pays in 
relation to what a service is worth to rather than 
according to what it costs the company to furnish the 
the charge for a 400-mile long-distance 
and at a 
a high-volume route costing 
a per circuit basis), or Boulder 
cities but 
mediate switches and several ; .. t .. ..,.,."''"'"''t'r'o 
of 
the customer pays the 
same rate. This entire ~~·AN•~• 
and 
the less routes which to 
compete. 
Another illustration of adverse effects 
competition deals with a fast growing segment of the 
network: cellular radiotelephone service. After 
move in 
technology was ""''""'''""''',.; 
tories), FCC it should be a competitive ser-
vice. Two entrants were to be licensed to serve in each 
geographical area. most cases, the local telephone 
company is one of these service providers. to 




tum contributed to un-
service. Small wonder 
this introduction of com-
monopoly service? Certainly. It 
that blows no good. first and 
col:np·etitive '"'~'"r"''""""''"""' carriers (OCCs), 
who would not otherwise exist, are beneficiaries. They 
any market they choose, so 
"''"''"'''1'1"' ren.uu.Jt:::> only on the denser and 
AT&T to serve the more 
are required to pay the local 




economic or service pur-
be paid by the telephone 
described 
in motion a series of decisions and are 
the court ordered Bell system divestiture 
the start of 1984. However, 
promulgated as 
(MFJ) in early J 982 
plan of reorganization (POR) 
year, have created further 
the telecommunications 
a document modifying 
to enter this 
along with 
ties, has led to some incredible network costs and 
transmission 






ment) go to 
the company with majority contents. 
Thus it evolved that the older structure, known as the 
Seventh Avenue 
the newer, called 
AT&T. very large amounts 






thousands of locations across the 
at a totc:d cost which but 
""'''"'"'""'""' in billions of dollars. Who pays for this waste? 
No one but the consumers of the service, of course. 
The need to separate intra- and 
interLAT A traffic and to route the latter via POPs has 
another adverse effect on· the network. The 
;.,..,.,.,.,..;'"', network and built over many 
and designed to operate under 
strict rules ensured that between any two points 
there was a multiplicity of routings available. So-called 
"high usage" trunk routes, engineered to carry roughly 
80 per cent of peak-hour offered calls, overflowed their 
traffic to a series of less direct high usage routes; even-
tually these overflowed to a route of last resort, called 
a "final" route. The latter typically handled overflowed 
traffic from a number of high usage routes. (See Figure 
3.) High usage route facilities were usually fairly direct 
and relatively inexpensive, while final routes, handling 
a small fraction of the total traffic, were more 
roundabout and costly, with intermediate switching. This 
very efficient network of high usage-final trunking as-
sured completion of over 99 per cent of offered traffic, 
E (St Louis) 
D (MemphiS) 
C (Little Rock) 




The Trunking Hierarchy 
V (Wayne) Regional Center 
(Class 1) 
W (Harrisburg) Sect1ona1 Center 
(Class 2) 
X (Scranton) Primary Center 
(Class 3) 






All customers are served by end offices such as A and Z 
above A "final" route (ABCDEVWXYZJ exists between any two 
end offices in the U. S.; however, the vast majority of calls com-
plete over one ol a series of less costly "high usage" routes 
which are tried first in a specified sequence. Only a few of these 
are shown above lor simplicity In this example, the first route 
would be ABCYZ. SubseQuent attempts, in order, would be 
ABCWYZ, ABCWXYZ. ABCVWYZ, ABCVWXYZ, ABCDVWYZ. 
ABCDVWXYZ, ABCDEWYZ. ABCDEWXYZ, ABCDEVWVZ, and 
finally ABCDEVWXYZ. 
In the national h1erarchy, there are only ten class 1 (Regional 
Center) off1ces. two o! which are shown above Each of these ten 
serves a number of class 2s, each of these in turn serves a 
number ol class 3s and so forth. Sample city names are shown 
itself, is or encounters a 
there are no alternatives the call is blocked. Here 
we have taken a and decisive step toward 





High Usage-Final Trunking 
Routes A-C. A-D. and C-D above (dashed lines) are 
designed to carry about 80 per cent of offered nP::<~r.nno 
When one of these - A-D - is busy (or defective), traffic 
goes via final (solid A·B-D. Likewise, high usage 
route A-G overflows via A-B-C. that A-B is to 
handle all A-B traffic plus overflows from A-D and nus 
HU-Iinal system leads to efficient use of facilities and, properly 
designed, a plus 99 per cent probability of call completion 
Postdivestiture Arrangement - POP Routing 
Irregular lines show the newly established LATA boundaries. Since 
C and D are in one LATA and A and B each in others. all traff1c 
in this simplified network except D-C must be handled by an 
1nterexchange carrier, which meets BOC facilities at a po1nt ot 
presence (POP) - B ;s such a point. High usage routes are 
prohibited A-C and A-D. As a consequence, A-C and A-D 1raff1c 
is handled over longer switched and more costly routes A-B-C 
and A-B-D. and protection from traffic surges or equipment fail-
ures is lost In short, poorer service at h1gher cost 
Many Bell system executives warned Congress, the 
regulatory authorities, and the public repeatedly that 
fragmentation of the network would not be in the pub-
lic interest. AT&T's Chairman, Charles Brown, summed 
up the situation before a Senate committee in April, 
1979:13 
I do not see (the network) can made to 
operate at a level even approaching its current 
of proficiency, reliability, and economy in the ab-
sence of some provision assuring the continuation of 
unitary management. 
13Charles t. Brown statement to U. S. Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Communications 
PUBliC: IJTII !Til=<:: I=()QTI>J!r!I.JT! v- '""'' !AOV ..,., • '"'"' 
of regulated 
from the 







I I I 
"The is gates, all 





..,.,, ... "''"" pur-
and resells it at 
snT·•pnrnr1J Function: - the uses 
c:tn.,."'''p to smooth out the con-
seasonal variations in load with the more 
stable supply of gas, and line to accom-
modate hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly varia-
tions between the amount of gas received and the 
amount redelivered . 
4) The Accounting and Control Function - where 
the pipeline provides a range of essentially book-
keeping f. . .mctions such as gas control, metering 
and measurement, invoicing and disbursements, 
and run statements to suppliers, ship-
pers, and customers. 
Over the next three to five years these four functions 
will be substantially unbundled and each service be 
priced explicitly and separately. The merchant function 
will become a rapidly decreasing source of revenues 
and profits for as this function is increasingly 
performed such as marketers, brokers, 
gas producers, and shadow pipelines. The eclipse of the 
merchant function will be accompanied by rapid 
in the transportation and exchange (T&E) function. 
Transportation will become the dominant source of rev-
enues profits for The big, integrated 
"superpipelines" being created mergers will also en-
joy substantial revenues and profits from their storage 
services. Indeed, the superpipelines may well manage, 
as contractors, the storage, gas and accounting 
functions for small, regional nir>~>h·np~ who may choose 
to contract out the functions and 
thus reduce overhead and '"'"~-'"'-''"'v" 
free trade in gas transportation will be accompa-
nied by a veritable for shipping 
party gas. Most gas transmission will find that 
the gas for resale will plummet over the 
next two to three years, while of. third-party 
gas will perhaps for 60 per cl"nt to 70 
per cent of gas transported. 
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services. 
tomer in a posUJ:on 
brief periods. The 





~ .. ".""'"'"' business 
and futures contracts for transporta-
tion services. 
A Price for All Seasons 
to mid-1986, spot gas prices will 
become and converge. The of re-
gional gas markets into a national market 
convergence in the prices 
from nr.nrt·nr••rc: 
of 1986, 
at the citygate 
or the plant 
tied to the main line of a transmission firm 
in the range of $2.75 per MMBtu and 
price of directly purchased gas delivered to 
gate of a gas user served by an LDC 
$3.15 and 53.50 per MMBtu in most states. 
Currently, as high as $5.50 per MMBtu are 
quently paid industrial users in some states. An 
ditiona! factor will cause convergence will the 
enormous pressure from gas consumers in states where 
LDCs now have tariffs of 75 cents to $2 
per MMBtu to these tariffs 
In the public utility commissions of these states 
may in a relentless cross fire 
from LDCs and gas consumers. 
resells this gas within 
LDC. 
gas business will be 
The new stars of indus-
,n,uu ,_.u" gas pro-
the mature 









The answer to the 
Richard Munson is a 
writer. His 
Janmt:mlh 
lies with energy 
s 
I 
As a result, Gulf Coast ~'flit!ffi""IV'?'l!litnl!"!:: 
farther for are 
their across rented util-




equivalent plants, or 
enough to nm a city the size of Corpus 
Chrtsti. 
· "Houston," says City Councilman Dale 
Golrc~msld, an enthusiastic cog:em~raltion 
. the Saudi Arabia cogenera· 
" tion potential." 
· Some state regulators aren't as enthusi· 
t astic about Texas's bounty. Donald Vial, 
'chairman of CaJifomla's Public Utliities 
·~ Commission, says that unfettered wiM~lblf! 
~ of oogenerated electricity eookl (ive eo-
~. ,enerato:rs an unfair edge on tbe open 
4-narket. Cogenerators could undercut 
rlated ut!Uties, cutting into their 
! That · coo.ld cost utilities customers and 
t force them to raise rates for those ms-
. tomers left on the systems. 
So far, Texas regulators have 
. lowed oogenerators to wheel power 
. ulated utilities, giving state regulators 
least partial control of the system. But, 
; warns Mr. Vial, "When you get into wbeel· 
ing, you have the potential for bypassing 
tlle whole regulatory process. We're DOt 







UTILITY REGULATION IN FLUX: 
THE FRANCHISE, PRIVATE SERVICE, 




CHAIRWOMAN GWEN MOORE: 0 Committee, 
a vital question: what is 1 
for Today, the utilities are 
? 
as a part of California 1 s scene. But, this has 
not always been case and it not the case tomorrow. 
ssures are being asserted Washington and in the 
state capitols to revise our conception of utilities and to amend 
or aboli statutes governing their ion. As provided by 
1 s, transportation, 
and water have been bedrock on our national state 
s cou develop. Today, competitors lenge 
franchise exc se 
them on a se competitors 
provide are dif from the 
s, because not serve the es public needs. 
sage 
191 , 
ss are now 
Recent 
cal state util 
Our 11 





























As you out 
, we 
t is 





f sea and 
s 
1 for a very good reason. t was 
were 
most 
economical and efficient way at that 
ces. Dis , if 
The monopoly pos was 




to being vertical 



















11, more f 
sion of 
structure that u 




area of stance. E s 
extent can se i , 0 
tern 
not a way 
t 1 So, 
s suggests, is 
telephones, we are 









BARKOWITZ: I'm sure 
11 0 







continue to be to 
ternat 
customer s to 
of In case of customers 
of a1 s, one to 
terms of "access, a you are 1 
telecommunication area. In essence it is very 
s 1 to service provided It says 
that if you choose to go el one 
But no 
to provide you is access to some source of supply. 
has to provide 
The next question that comes 
supply. 
is, what if cutomer 
wants to come back? What if she dec1des to have fling and 
s doesn't 1 el 
real wants to come 
util 1 ? From a 1 I one to 
that obl ion t is c a 
stment wou be 
customers to come 
customers are now on the t to 
1 f on else 







































set of of 
s privately-owned 
). These players 
are in sagreement over things like access, hydropower, and the 
circumstances of their 1 In to ize that 
would need to develop a common 
s, so that a market could exist and eve be 
with the same deck. You don't now, 
of the associated with 











s like we have 
it It isn't a 
isn't at all. is no bidding 





side. side is 
raised about 
whether we 




































s Does mean then 
to 
State has to 
state Cali ? 
e 
structures are to 
to be rethought in to al 1 to 
are kinds of issues one confronts in 
ar kind of c 
Now, if we are talking about uti s keeping customers 
and utilities losing customers, one question ses: why do 
utilities want to keep customers? Why is it in the public 
interest for utilities to keep customers? Let's take the gas 
transportation case. In a situation where you have a fixed 
system, and virtual no to add capital, 
can say that the more customers and the more sales the better, 
because you have a bigger base on which to allocate a fixed 
number of costs. Let's take electricity now. In the case of 
electricity, in order to open up a market, you probably have to 
lop a lot of additional facilities. You have to build new 
tran ssion lines and distribution lines and whathaveyou. And 
1 of sudden, you have a case where you are allocating 
additional cost to an uncertain number of customers. In this 
ca 
to an 
may not the st of existing customers to 
those stments made. Because, instead of a contribution 
you may have to make up a bigger margin 
Those tradeof are going to have to be made by 
st of those core customers. are an 
9 
1 lot of issues ~ich cons s 
are about a fixed capital It becomes a 
you are ta 
is go~ng to pick up the risk 
In closing, I think there are two 
at one look: (1) regulator re 
Obviously, there are a 




structure an approach. The f I wou call a '' 
That's basically a case where you 
a core group of customers. We are to 
group of customers. We are going to all 
accounts and other kinds of mechanisms to 
amount of risk that the utility 
service is minimized. We are 
costs. We are going to protect 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: How 
now? 
DR. BARKOWITZ: We have 




















is to al to 
ing ar~a. To eliminate some o 
ustment sm e 
, turn say, 
customers, can out and do that. 
associatE:d with II 







You can take 
without 
endangering the core group? If you allow them to go off and take 
risk as see fit to do •.. ? 
DR. BARKOWITZ: Well, you cou take revenue streams 
that are associated with certain parts of the markets, with 
certain kinds of sales, and treat them ratemaking purposes. 
You can have balancing account mechanisms that would only 
to certain customer classes, and you could put other s 
outside of the customer classes. For example, in the s 
transportation area, the Commission has said that for 
market, the utilities are to keep 25 percent of 
they make on transportation over and above the 3¢ 
It would make for some pretty complicated regualtion, 
but could start to segment and apply different ratemaking 
an 
you 
As part of an evolution of strategy to getting into 
f you lt the need to protect the core market, 
would be talking about differentiating ratemaking 
sms on a scale never done fore. 
11 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: IS of 
se? 
MR DUNCAN WYSE: I we to care 
how -v1e customers and the 
customers a world of greater As 
out, if a customer group a lot of 
to have 1 to serve 
customers, are there or not, then there 
e lity shareholders or 
is incumbent upon the Coromiss to try to 
s recognize competition and protect 
ratepayers who could suffer, due 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Who no 
MR. WYSE: Frankly, I don't think we 
there is enough competition 
gas, electricity, telecommunications 
at tent to those issues. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Are we 
MR. WYSE: Absolutely. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Give me 



























contracts. We are 
now, as we 
to restructure rates to re 
in each 
f 
's got to 
to 
are 
It is an 
on 
to try to nature of to 
util and to best protect 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We have been j counter 
the Senate. Let me "Welcome! 11 to Senator 1 
Are of s ss? If not, I will 
We are to change around. We are going to go 
from Nature Ut 
o it f we can have the Energy 
to the Energy side 
1: Dan Gibson Steve 
e 






I'm Steve pres 
I am to to concentrate on the 
is here to ta gas. But just to 




CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: 't we start out a 
and tell me concerns and 
we can 
MR. REYNOLDS: In 








and tr s to 
that residential customers, commerc 














rests squarely on 
1 
it is a 






we call our core customers 
commerc customers, 











e s can 
1 s $100 11 
If a re rates, customers e to 
own facility which is 
probably economic to do in light of 's rate structure we 
could potentially lose $26 llion. Under present 
mechanisms, that would have to be picked up by other customers. 
That is of considerable concern to us. That's one example. If 
that particular alternative proliferates, it and 
The whole problem of electric bypass grows. 
In terms of QF deve and other concerns, 
obvious part of the problem is the fact that our cost 
structures are not necessarily balance. Part of that is the 
history of regulation. There is a major change in the regulated 
iness over the last few years. I think there is a that 
can done. If we knew that we had no obligation to serve 
industrial customers, we could do a to try to our 
costs. We would plan something less than serving 1 
customers. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Are you tell me you 
not serve 1 customer? 
MR. REYNOLDS: No, I'm not saying that I think there 







a customer on 
MOORE I 
SHER: Wou 




se customers on 
so if a customer is to 





them at all. 
a question for 
out? I a customer 
a suggestion 




I m necessar I 
to 
was scussed a 
IS on ? 
.. 
REYNOLDS: .L we care at 
the 1 and to decide it any sense or not. 
AS SEMBL Yf.'lAN SHER: You ust sa a 
very 1 to PG&E not to have to plan capac for 
or at t 't want to, is costly to provide that 
ity, in the system. 
generate their own power, 
i are going to go off and 
required to that. I 
you would avoid that by not being 
you already made up your mind on 
that, at least. Isn't that what you said a minute ago? 
MR. REYNOLDS: I didn't mean to that we made 
our minds. I mean, these are the types of issues need to be 
considered, right now, some provided. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: If was possible to do it in the 
law, would you advocate prohibiting any customer from going it 
alone and bypassing the system? 
MR. REYNOLDS: I don't think we would recommend that it 
would be prohibited, but we would want the ability to compete 
with customers ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Compete? You mean you want to be 
able to offer a lower rate to your core customers in order to 
them on the tern? Is that ? 
MR. REYNOLDS: We wou at least 1 to have the 
lity to discount our own rates as long as we are recovering 
our incremental costs • You can use anything above our 


































' Assoc tion 
on those issues, but 
s 




, to the harm 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: m make 
or 
or 
to do You are not ready to say 
• REYNOLDS: I we want to look 
a s. 
MOORE ? 









, to analyze, 
or 
your unstated 
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t we move to 






and some rea 
Let mt:! ust you one 
















the "Yel syndrome, '' 
can serve" 1 
MOORE: s a speech ? 



















































i s, we l 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: 
? Is 
k of f 
PUC? 
11 












to attract se customers he is ? 
r.m. WYSE: For EOR 
, to market in 
tariff will a to all customers 
move s Cali 
AS SEMBI .. Y!v'I...AN SHER: Just EOR is a good 
il Mr. St 1 
went 1 
t s , over two of 
s, r ? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I am sure California Gas 
11 some comments 1 s. 
25 
From I read the papers, there 






a on EOR. Some of 
s 
the private pipeline, 
in the great tradition 
not to build those 
, if they want in the 
lin~s. You supported 
n Sher, the EOR 
the Commission offers a 
shipper. It is 
with the kind of 






of stories from 
ines. All I can tell you, from 
Cal Gas and PG&E 
we have an existing 
therefore 
We can offer them on a 
a 












dEsire to go with 
as what they can get 
s think that? Do 
11 think that when they 
matter of fact, 
Gas. 
couple of them already 
SHER in these proceedings? 
2 
were support of 
1 a more freedom, 
I was talking about, 
II 
st deal they can 
us to 
customers ••• 
a better deal 


































comes out of 
sn' have 
extent we customers or something 
customer 1 
our contract 
But we are bu ss of 
In , we have one customer, Texaco, who s 
1on a contract. 
mon 
well as the rna or cond 
have 
last two 






















to get to wheel it 
that we are 
issues. One is 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We've that. I am more interested 
l>iR. 
se issue 
issue is the service territory 
market. As you know, 
a week and a half ago 
answer stion? 
see Duncan on edge of his 
to to me. 
to answer question 
f di 








a week and half ago. 
resolution, tell me. 
was a 









R\'lOMAN MOORE: line was major one. PG&E 
was one wa s a 
. GIBSON: at s 
of 
use 0 the 
down at cost. We 
was 
to Gas, 
on to it which was 
s to serve us own 
so, had to some sort of ensure 
of 
CHAI MOORE: So 1 over 
barrel? 
MR. GIBSON: I we to 









s for the cooperat~on. I 
now on that basis. I am 
negotiating. 
was a between the 
under the auspices of 
assure this market is 




That would not 
fit to the 
to build 
Let's take 
s are you going to get 
is to go back into 
s to be part of your 
a sif~ed-kind of 
facilities. 












Ca Gas or ourse 
s, are to 
3¢ , we would 
1 amount of 
customers, will enjoy 1 of 






CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But if are using your current 
and for by ratepayers, 
justi 
MR. GIBSON: 
g 25 percent to the ? 
If we were to 1 those facil s, 
ss would be there and would 
customers. That is 
have to be borne by 
problem faced by 
se 
of the 
, as they face greater competition. We re 
to go out meet 
the f 
we want to assure that we have 
1 
work in 
to meet that 
If we , we want to assure goes 
to our core customers. IS s is 1 
's we are 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But only 75 percent. 
MR. GIBSON: No, we are ta about only the 25% of 






If we to 3.1¢ per therm, then 25% of 
goes to s. 
I just trying to understand 
s isn t it all put back into the 
. RAWLINGS: Let me you Southern Cal Gas's 
on our 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: 
MR RAWLINGS: No. 
Our rate f return 
se can 11 
25% 




was put in there. It wasn't a 
to give back 100 percent? 
as a utility service, 
on our invested capital. I 
PUC in there. We 
We trouble. We were 
the rate for the EOR's. We 
potentially go 
for the 
customer and to as much as it 
s was the way to give the 
as poss le, while, of 





is going to be a theme 
the kind of 
s we have 
are c st to the customers, as much we have to 
bui lt in 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, are to be a lot 
correct? 
MR. WYSE: Well, direction. 
are a f proposals other 
MR. RAWLINGS: I just add, it has always gone 
rection. 
CHAIRWQII1AN MOORE: That's interesting. Mr. Rawlings you 
can add to Mr. Gibson said. 
• MR. RAWLINGS: , I will be f. Dan has hit on a 
number of items. I represent the Southern fornia Gas 
We are a gas-only utility. We don't have both sides the 
bases 
CHAIRWO~~N MOORE: Excuse me. Mr. Sher, you missed 
Duncan clarified the PUC's ro What they are doing is 
giving a bonus. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: The 25 s. For 11 
• contracting? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's it. 
MR. RAWLINGS: In any event, our lenges are a little 
fferent, some respects, from a combined gas and electric 
's. In a period of market and 
35 
out. U 
key lenge we have, number one, 
exi customers? Half of the volume of 
customers have the capability of 
fuel, 1 1, propane, or diesel 
f 
newspapers these 
dropped out of the oil 
, all of 
as a result of that, I 
consumers will benefit 
run. But our as a utility is that 
service, competitively, to our large 





, we forego Inevitably, the rates 
customers 1 to to cover those costs. That 
we are 
CHAIR'V10¥LAN MOORE: always been a challenge. 






1 to fuel switch. 
? proportion, if 
out this oil decline has 
to twenty days, you 
the San Diego Gas and 








are now 01. have been 
We are 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Dan or 
one go? 
MR. GIBSON: 97 
of our s use, 
















small commerc customers. It 
, as s 













we over 25 
to alternative 1 
't as on 
f, they 
We lose customers the 
ss 
, as a 
of our 
efforts to 
f our residential and 
But the 
, because oil prices 
users are 
customers you 
Gas & E 







. RAWLINGS Cal a 
i 
uti t in 
f 
state: 
El Paso Natural Gas Transwestern Gas is 
of now Houston Natura Gas 
a 







State of Cali 
to EOR 
ASSEMBLY~~N SHER: I 









































CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You gave f years? 
MR. RAWI,INGS: Right. 
MR. WYSE: They wanted that k of security, because 
a the price se on them next year. 
CHAIRWOMAN HOORE: The PUC , though, was five 
MR. WYSE: years. 
MR. RAWLINGS: Or greater. A five year minimum. 
MR. GIBSON: From the point of of PG&E, yes, 
these customers might go over to the interstate 
We are to do everything we can, in terms of 
them an attractive rate and attractive terms and 
conditions of service, to encourage them not to. Assemblyman 
Sher, that is way we can 





to get pipel:l .. ne 
I have heard s that 
or make it a v1able alternative. 
is something in this PUC order 
that was ca to it f t, if not impossible, 
41 
? 
of their own gas 
1 have an open opt~on to 
beyond which it 
of them long-term 
to make for a 
, I really 
one night 
s case you took to the PUC 
from the •.. 
You 11 
do fie 
with you. Is that 
are 1 suing the Mohave 









customers in the state, PG&E and So Ca Gas. El Pa 
two 
exact 
to into same concern ~hat you 
and prov new 
our test You 
here. We 
state. Converse 
80 of our revenue 
s state more 
over Paso system. So, we are 1 
or not. J..n , it a 
we to 
At the 1, we are 
dec es is 
terms of t 
Commission (FERC) , 
of a 
a El Paso, 
an to serve. So, we a 



























amount of gas that we 
scussions with 
we don't we can 
s 




short term gas. To 
Cal 
lower 
our own VJe 












some ba re to our 
s customers our to 
CHAIR~JOHAN MOORE: Hr. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Does El Paso a 
d to 1 ? 
MR. SIMON: No, s Our s 1 
of the 
ASSE!>1BLYMAN SHEH: f the oi to 
lt to ir 1 ie wou to do to 
? 
MR. SIMON: We turn lt over to So Cal PG&E 
to oil 






, or we we, 



































customer, :tvlr. Sher. You 
le perspective. on this) : 
Mohave Pipeline, the 
It didn't want it, 
utilities to provide a 
was a group of customers 
ly wanted 
couldn 1 t get it over 
PUC around,. is that 
idea? 
turned the PUC 
lves. 
t have problem with this 




ssion, and El 
want to speak for them. 
? don't have a 
SHER: You ine So, we ve 
wrong 
CHAI It a 1 
State 0 i 
ASSEMBLYl4A.N SHER: You may are 
not PUC to at 
one that was a of ifornia 
Act. 
MR. SIMON: We to 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE But, El Paso in same 
to as vlell. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: current del it to 
terns. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: own 1 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: own 1 to the 
i Gas PG&E s ... 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: s. 
ASSEMBLY-HAN SHER: Yes, and to 1 
• 
CHAIRWOMAN HOORE: 
ASSEMBLYJIA.AN SHER: can out, I think. 
MR. SIMON f 1 te bypass, you are going 





I'm not a of them, 
ust want to f out what's going on with the 
• SIMON: IS it is all about . 
MOORE: I guess isn't feasible for you to 
if the lities are going to be 
is one consideration and one 
, as to whether the partners in Mohave will 
are there 1 out there willing to 
commitment ing repayment of the cost 
1 ? If there are not, we aren't going to build it, 
none 1 bui So, 1t is up to the customers. 
sf they are receiving ••. 
s 
We are ta about millions of 
line, aren't we? 
nul 
SHER: I want to know 
or take. 
1S in this PUC 
the oil companies to sign that 
are bas that the 
some of flexibility. 
s I thought. That means 
s of yours don't like this order 





s of term contracts if 
i 
i a 1 
somewhere 1988 or 
19 9. If we our customers, we 
't jump to an until 1991. 
ASSEl"lBLYMAN SHER: So, you to all of 
capital it , but you won't start on 
until s five-year 
MR. SIMON: Well, reality of us a 
1 
FERC hearings ? It 
1989 we haven't even started 
to take at least a year of 
Mohave, much more than that for for El Dorado 
Kern 
back 
since it a very extensive going all way 
Wyoming, on a brand new route. I think the is 
that v;e don 1 t 







to a private pipeline 
possibility anyway, 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHF~R: I'm not an advocate in s, I 
all. I'd 1 
of 
to 
who, are customers of PG&E -- but not 
off system now. ss you can 
Palo Alto, because it 
us a differential 
them back on rate, as to other c s, to 
system, I don't I S to 
49 
IMON one of the lowest gas rates on 
PG&E 




never to treat us as a wholesale 
. SIMON: 
to 
is a dif 
at 
, or at 
and the 
s 
Coming back to this, 
of matter. The whole 
a good part of it including 
signed to make it very 
to compete. Yet you 
Is that wrong, El Paso? 
term is right in that 
of discomfort on the 
interstate service. I 
o rece 
It really depends 
Obviously, Texaco an 
1 Gas and they are 















Mr. Simon on the 
are his two biggest 
to ask Mr. Wyse. 
is very explicit in 
way to serve the EOR's 
, because their 
to other ratepayers. 
• 
ASSEMBLYNAN SHER: I can 
s me your opinion: underlies s order, 
to ensure EOR customers the gas 
PG&E? 
MR. WYSE: I 
is to serve 
ratepayers to do so. 
ss 's decision 
Commission and the util 
se it is in the interest of 
ASSEMBLYr4AN SHER: That, of course, goes against the 
competition. The PUC's still protecting its traditional 
constituents, the ratepayers, in the best way it sees 
s 
MR. WYSE: As well as to to the EOR market. 
ASSEMBIJYMAN SHER: Some would argue that ultimately the 
1 companies would have done better with the private pipelines 
they have with the regulated utilities. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Dan, I am not going to give you a 
chance. Jan is getting tired of sitting here. Come on, Jan, 
you're on. 
MS. JAN HAMRIN: I sometimes use as an analogy the 
electric utility industry as an o couple that has not gotten 
along for years , to the extent they've forgotten why 
ever got together. But they have so much community property 
they can't find any way to split. 




the other is 
other potential 
of those. We got 
looks good for 
together anyway 
property and 
It lS in no way a 
"competition." 
we an industry 
ition. I believe 
same time. It 
you have only 
a of places you 
numbers and 
purchase price 
to work out. 
then open it to 
out of this whole 
has 
For first time 
in every 
There is, of 
is someone else 







rates at the PUC, 
I 
CHAimvm<1AN 









s Steve I 
MR. REYNOLDS: We were always honest. Those 
MS. HAMRIN: I am not always on all the cases 
Steve's in. We miss the nuclear cases at moment. I 
is some real in gett1ng a look at what 1s 
on the are paying. On the issue of 
s, me say two things. One, is a symptom of a problem. 
When can bui an electric generation ility for, some 
cases, half the cost of purchas electricity from the 1 
is a real problem rates, structure, and how that came 
to be. S larly, bypass is much more severe if you are looking 
at a system. In the e util area, none of 
1 s are They are growing ly and, the most 
, we have not seen ss 
the e I think I wi end with and 
stions. 
CHAIR\·JU~lAN MOORE: stions? Mr. Sher? All right, 






Anybody want to 
you go on that. 
Nature of Utility 
area. Shall we start with 
We w~ start with AT&T. 
Assemblywoman Moore and 
I represent AT&T, which 
conversations I have heard, I 
of freedom and one 
to say I join in 
es , as a surrogate for 
or isn't fair. 
, is directed toward 
, are organizations 
ion. AT&T 1s not 
s in any part 
a a 
Ca 
s with a number of 
ince the 1ntroduction of 
not a monopoly. Let's 
're not a monopoly. 
role. I won't say 
in s 1 us 






not we are. We 
f interstate 
abil control or ex 
1 virtue of our 
















































s, or, even 










would be better 
s that we could 
total freedom, how 
freedom how much 
no way, Assemblywoman 
I we would 
What would occur 
share virtue of the 
't be increasing your 
, we have the 
have potential of 
services that are 
want to the 
in helping the 
st. Without him, we 
we are in iness. 


































CHAIRWOMAN l"l:OORE: How 11 on 
users 





to s now 
57 
s? How 
of of costs to 
IS two We 





st that they 
bypass or are 
told that one of the 
you can't determine 
who are 
o a survey. 




of costs has 
Util s 
I only 











to a low for more 
customer. I thank 
not 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me 
the ft by PUC of 
enough for AT&T to now 
network? 










case. But, me add, AT&T's posture is we 
not 
not want to 
We 
s. We have no p 




Commission to remove 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You 





you will not bypas 
MR. DENNIS: I m not 
we 

















s not occur. 
That 
is to to 
I It 
I 't 
sser. It s 
customer 1 not 
1 
ss if 
1 s are ef 
enough to do so. They can of at a sser rate. They 
can do , continue to make a prof make a continued 
to rna rates. I 
believe IS of e 
I earlier. of 
CH1HRWO:tJI.AN But 11 can't tell me 
is r-1r. 
, I 
MR. WYSE: is 
ing 
s will occur 
what we have 
how fast 
tell me? The PUC issues 
stion, of course. is 
It is always a judgment call, 
at what ice we can 
Commission's judgment was to scourage significant 
bypass 
that's all I 
I we are 
You never 
CHAIRW0:£1-lAN MOORE: 













of 1.5 to 2 cents 





to e s. We are 11 to 
to ~t in 
CHAIRWOMAN ~100RE: How was PUC 
if 't I AT&T 
MR. WYSE: It was major. Not ust AT&T, 1 
s. We at 
who 




ss I think that 
was the basis of the 
basically provides 
FCC policy really 
is no question 
't we continue to move 
name is Glenn 
the rate 
s for an 




to me, huh? 
news is they have 
month. so, 
to 150% of the 

























state at f s 
So, we of 
si 
to comment 
are We 't want 
We want to serve our 
we re we want to 
1'100RE You also 
s the users se customer 
















d 1 to comment on 
icy and 
a 




user ha to be 
to some of 
ratemaking ••• 
of what is 




, but it 
exactly 







PUC tell us 




rate case to 
0 s 
calls? 
we must , our 






use ss than a 130 ca s 
$9.00. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That 
what are now? 
MR. SULLIVAN: are 
1 te service as low 
si 
I mean se 
to no more than 
sents of change 
$8.25 now. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: So, are riot ta about much of 
you off. 1 I d 't mean to 
f-1R SULLIVAN: 
s We have 
) . But we 
costs. The same s 







s to the economic 
market, as 















You're not exactly 
we should in 
costs of providing the 
we 
we 
't have to equal 
to a degree. Two 
rates, but only 
1 service. We 
costs down, so that 
We are willing to 
to add that all around 
customers. 
ion with some 
best 
s is by 
to use rate sign 
We will need some 
1 market 
to a comment on FCC 








ld be We case 
Court on that l.SSUe We have at Of course, 
we In ata re 
0 is 
rea c 1: we 
are not a 0 1 
te we can It is 
not 
1 l. 
MR. WYSE T s I is not J.. , 
istic. 
CHAI don to 
te to t mean 
cal an 














of customers, small 
a 
to 
care of their 
costs. Residential 
as having some 
s , and other 
user. But small 
s are frequently 
are particularly 
ft 
lf. I have been 







a variety of 
are very 
















CENTEX is not the 
threat to Bell. We use Pacif 's 
1 , we don t a 
our 












































may later turn 
for inviting 
comments. Let me 
and his 
concerns that he 













bus ss~s provide value-added s to same 
k f discounts that we provide to large users. One of 
we're on right now is a recommendation would 
include Mr. Howley's firm and others in a class of service 
whereby the discounts we would provide them would be based on 
savings. They could aggregate the small customers, pass 
those savings along, and added their value in management as well 
as other kinds of service that would be beneficial to those small 
users. We are working with them. We have every plan to move 
forward with that in the pendency of the present rate design 
hearings. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Now, let me ask you one last 
question, Mr. Howley. You also are a strong advocate of shared 
tenant services that would actually bypass the local network and 
hookup directly to AT&T. 
MR. HOWLEY: I don't represent the shared tenant 
services. We are an agent for a group of customers. We don't 
aggregate traffic at a private PBX where that traffic is a 
perfect target for bypass. We take that traffic to Bell's 
Centrex System. definition, it is captive traffic for 
fie. What we would see as important to the small business 
user whom we represent is the right to select from the tariffs in 
same fashion that a Fortune 1000 company would select, as 







MOORE: be a little bit more 
t ? Duncan? 
He' if he could bring together 
1 ss customers to advantage of the high 
MOORE: In 
Fortune 000, 
HOWLEY: We shou 
to advantage of the 
words, if in the aggregate 
ld be able to have the same 
interest our from 
able to pick and choose in the 










you from doing that 
s. 
can do that, right? 
11 go to cable, the changing 
telecommunications 
you, Madam Chair. Michael 
for California Cable 
to focus on how to 
service and thus, 













Act of 9 
as the provis 
cable 
some other kinds of 




to rest the 
sion signals. That 
not treated as a 
util ss. As we have discussed many times, the 
cable industry is also interested 1n and well suited to provide 
other telecommun1cation services. Therefore, we remain 
interested 1n this question of how to determine difference 
betwen a private bus ss a public utility. 
When the issue of regulating a new telecommunications 
service is scussed, we often lose sight of the purpose for 
utility regulation. 
There are three reasons why publ utilities are traditionally 
regulated. It is important to those in mind in looking at 
any new business and see how they fit the test. The three 
tests are the lowing: (1) a business has natural monopoly 
characteristics, (2) it provides a consumer necessity, and (3) 
its customers have no bargaining power. 
test is the business has natural 
monopo characteristics. In the distribution of water, power, 
1 telephone is only going to be one likely 




a monopolist does, 
s. 
I think that is 
ic telephone service. 
to the third, 
You are dealing with 
monopolist, there 




kind of animal 
The kind we 
multi-point to 
monopoly 
s, and a 
fiber, wire, 
radio signal off 
monopoly 
are consumer 
customers that lack 
out there. These 
Ill 
• 
customers who to go to. know how to 
can a own 
real e on No 
one is to re or ce at monopoly 
ls 
One more we to 1 into is to that, 
se te is lated as a public 
all communication services must One example I would like to 
give is 
because 
service, which is often regulated as a ut 
those characteristics I described. You take 
another transportation provider like a car agency it's 
transportation and it s with buses, but no one would 
suggest that it is necessary to apply utility regulation to 
car business. There are lots of competitors. It is not a 
consumer necess and there is bargaining power. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I must commend you, Michael, that's 
clever. 
MR. MORRIS: We think the point-to-point business should 
be seen on its own. Just as rental car s are free to 
compete with regulated utili s, providers of advance 
telecommunications serv~ces should be free also. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: ~1r. Wyse, do you want to describe how 
characterize "new telecommunication services"? I think Mr. 




the PUC. We 
in 
introduction of 
that exists to 
as best we can 
competition makes 
sts today. During 
st. 






1 s as best it 
ing? 
next decade. 
that the cable 
boundary of 
to draw that 
II 
• 
CHAIRWO~~N MOORE: We are at 
st.:: to definitions. I thi is one of 
the that has to be reconci at some 
1 t we , ~1r. Winn? 
MR. MICHAEL WINN: My name is Michael Winn. 
I 1 to to 
here rather the ~ssues 
have been brought up 
were brought up in the 
paper; both are relevant. I believe I have served 
each of se particular industrit::s my career with regard to 
te , in various ways. I was one of the pioneers 
in the tenant service iness and established a building 
in Los Angeles which was recognized as one of the most 
sticated and comprehensive services available among 
intelligent buildings in the country at that time. It still is. 
I as an aggregator. I negotiated an agreement 
with a CATV provider in Los Angeles for the carrying of signals 
used for telecommunication purposes on their coax. I spoke as 
the for a.n AT&T presentation to developers in Los 
Ange 
of 
s on, "I Pa~d Pac~f Bell a lot of Money." They were one 
beneficiaries of our aggregation services in Los Angeles. 
are a couple of points that may lead to a new way 
at problem. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Michael, while you are doing all 





which is to be 
technologies so 
I think you will 
of us here are 
, and oriented 
performing a 
the service is 
lure of some 
of regulating the 
than to its profit 
profit centers. 
within each 
about the nature 
se services 
to the fact 
f fiber optics 
fferent 
be available. 
1on, computer, and 
information 
1 t want to have 
s the hands of 
to their 
of s. Also, 







to occur, s of and provides 
the 
money. 
some of the partie 
enormous ) ? one of the regional Bell 
s have revenues of $7 to $8 llion a year 
1 guys, as I it. It is a huge amount 
The company I am now working in Los Angeles is 
in 
proposing to a fiber-optic system under'a franchise in the 
City of Los Angeles, down Wilshire Boulevard, to provide 
point-to-point icitly, but also other services such 
as two-way video, teleconferencing, and things like that. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That would competition to 
1 and competition to local telephone service as well. But, 
up your , you are forgetting that one player 
also has the re ibility of keeping rates lower and affordable 
to a group. All of the things you're talking about are 
inating, the concern we have here is but revenues lost to 
s you are now scribing. It is Mr. Wyse's job, at least 
to he sents, to maintain that balance. 
r1R. WYSE: is a couple of points about that. 
First, idizat that occurred in long dJ.stance, if you 
can 1 is subs shi to shorter distances. So, 







CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But 
















it is placed in 
AT&T for 
r "Software Define 
suddenly have 
are not going to 
, now. It is 
way we interpret 
we have to get 
a basis for 
of small 
1 to providing a 
technolog We 
we somehow have to 
to be held. 
s that we have to 
to defining the 
'swell taken. 
to tell us, let's 




that r..ve o r. We have 
customers in -- who use 
i 
to 
s we are us 
s 
ce when ~s approved ( I am 
1 will so use Paci Bell . 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: "Will use 
be bypass? 
fact w~ two 
service. We hav~ 
Uti 
resolution. In both 
Pacific Bell. Of the 
to sign up for the 
positively now), 
fie Bell." It 1 not 
MR. DENNIS: It will not be bypass. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You hear 1 Michael? 
HR. MORRIS: I hear 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Anybody else want to make any parting 
comments? Paci Bell? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. I would like to clear the record. 
Pacific Bell operating revenues for 1985 ,we~e about $8 billion. 
Second, I invite committee's to this issue of 
It goes beyond external competition. Pacific feels 
with a relative 1 f ld, we are perfectly 
capable of competing. We have good resources and good 
On~ of th~ we see happening today, in 
terms of new is that our prudent management of the 
puts us at a disadvantage. 


































I just want to 
us. I 
inesses shouldn't be 
much. It been 
hearing from us because there are 
we want to further pursue. 
F , our st two sses -- don't go away, Mr. 
se. Our t two sses are going to be Mr. Schre , who 
shortly after we got 
tell us a 1 bit 
Then if are 
, and Mr. Noll, who is going 
of changing util1ty 
stions,. we will go to them. 
So, don t we have Professor Schreiber, then we will have 
Pro ssor 1 to c 
IBER: Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, 
~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~-
I 1.ate I am Harry Schreiber, and I am 
sor of law a the of ifo,rnia, Berke I am 
an hi I have wr1tten on of ifornia law. 
I 
Cal law. I also work 
two ects are over 
out. I have some 
background of regulation in 
the area of federalism. These 
s 
83 
ways you want to sort 
I 11 submit for 
Mr. Wyse's optimism 
a on local service. 
I think the 
in the last 
to rule, they 
an interstate 
We 
on part of the 
lated. This 
I think we are 
new is a 
bottle, which has 









1 attest with respect 
ization and 
The a ve elabor a period of 




sectors of economy 
s area of control very 
New Deal period, publicly it 
ly managed. Then in the 





, as new agencies were and new 
accustomed to this pattern 
or phenomenon of a federal government regime which is 
expanding regulation, preempting the states. There are a few 
sting exceptions l the control law, in which 
Cal fornia has ial status. By and large, though, that has 
the pattern three-quarters of a century. 
Now, we have the same instruments, that marvelous 
two-bladed sword, in the hands of an administration and agencies 
that are 11-bent on deregulation. In some of the literature 
was luded in s excel background paper (I think it 








ject1.ves from soc 
of resource 
or income distribution 
Well, beginning, of course, 
been involved in trying to achieve a 
l of these factors. I think 




















1 trial basis for 
s state. But, it 
1 sm. There has 
Congress acted 
power. This 
that out a little 
• 
we us fasc and 
marvel of 0 structures 
extent to can 
we can 1 
our pol 
of the structure, the extent 





CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We always rel on the 1934 
Communication Act. Essentially, it set up a partnership. I 
guess it is not so clear. We thought that intrastate was 
intrastate and under the control of the Public Service 
ssion. Interstate was under FCC. We pretty much 
operated on that basis. But, what I hear you telling me is that 
it's not as clear as Mr. Wyse to me. 
PROFESSOR SCHREIBER: I think is not clear in the 
case that is now judication by Supreme Court, the 
Louisiana. The Fi Circuit Court actually stated, with respect 






is the of 
we recognize that s 
the state ing authority, 
ity. 'I'hat' s a 
I don t congratu the court for 
, Madam Chairwoman. I simply saying to that cone 
that I think that trend is for the 1 courts to stand 









these ions to the 
and, in the 
1 residual state 
PUC is also -- aren't you 
are a party in? 
decision. I 
to It has been 
We are very 
is a classic case. 
setting depreciation 
into rates as a 
looking at us, and they 
on depreciation. We 
re ibility to 
Con of State 
course, comes on the heels 





, a very 
to the 
more important 
case, that we should 
• 
leave to the ss 
sent state interests s us reasons 
a 11 s 
1 will agree more 
MOORE: We 11 go to 
Noll, who is going to tell us all of s means economical 
-- all uncerta , al we heard about today, 
what it's to the regulatory 
NOLL: And, if you -----------------------
some for you! 
It is extraordinari ff to 
should be about in minutes. 
following ways. of all 
i deregulation, 
seems to me that it would be an 
here in i 
that, I've 
ize what 
Let me just try 




that's ideological. The President's 
Policy, in the Johnson administration, 
Force on Communication 
more in interstate te 
case against AT&T was filed under Nixon, 
(in terms of the staff work) Carter, 
r So, 
























deregulation of EPA, 
is a different 
traditional public 
, and it is 
logy and the second 
of all, it is a 
about a gas pipe, 
street, or twisted copper wire 
is a a company. 
on electronics, 
it is making 
costs of providing 
5 or 6 percent a 
aspects of 
s the formance through 
we have natural 
dollar 
If ical cost to the 
sts rising, you're likely to 
reasons, eros o viability of a 
even sts to some 




CHAIRWOMAN MOORE You're who 
's lt is s of Mr. 
is 
a o customer i 





PROFESSOR NOLL: ! s core 
has to do the idy 
the subsidy 
we don't 1 
is the flip side of 
monopol We don't 1 
charge extraordinari 
have done with public util 
"Well, AT&T, (or PG&E or whatever}, is 
a monpolist towards some customers as 
te 
stion, exactly. The 
The bad news about 
As a society, 
monopol s because they 
people off. we 
is , in old days, 
okay for you to be 
as give it back to 
some of the others." Now, , of course, is , as 
the natural monopoly aspects go 
sustained without trying to prevent 





The (Li line) bill 
was fie, because 
who serves 
way to g 
teenager s on 












a night. I 







the s 1 tvm years ago, I paid 
than I one in Palo Alto. 
I 't 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I we to do that. 
PROFESSOR NOLL: Yes. But 's problem number one. 
two is that lf is a source of 
ff what to AT&T since 
have over f of to market and 
s. 
In ear 1970's, be the Federal Communications 
were saying, "Nobody us can make a device to 
's safe and efficient. 
to destroy the world 
all of their 
else on it, is 
I! have now c 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: 
PROFESSOR NOLL: No, 
s, AT&T s had to 
, now think 
f 
is a 
weren t telling the truth, then. 
weren't. The fact of the 
an extreme efficient 
PacTel. They have one 
is 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: But, if Mr. 
all of which were 
ier. That is what's 
idy is coming from. 









s to eat 
rate 
up 
t' s not, the 
at all cost. 
s, 
ze revenue at the state l out of 
'ilhat 
, and eat away 
s said 
rid of 








is to like Bank of America 
to write-off three hundred 





off Centrex and leaving 
happens is 
1 ratepayer. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Not if Mr. 
PROFESSOR NOLL: Well, 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I 
are 


























s access ity there, 
to get it out. 
to with. 
bad news about 
cost point of 
is probably not real 
is the vast 
is not wildly 
run telephone 





























, but a lot 
of customers 
lity. Given k 
or a th is not 
no to use the local exchange 
of r that's a good 
issue. There are reasons that's 
' techno s and 1 's what we 
That's the ity. que does mean 
to the PUC? What it means, I think, is that we have to broaden 
our responsibilities beyond ion of 







conclus is the 










? The captive 
for the PUC, 




re are doing that. 
recent PacBe rate base, their rates 
are 














to nd to 




tors are f 
so that we can 
We have to understand what the 
~7e to understand utility costs 
makes sense to reduce 
, we aren't interested in reducing rates 
a cross-subs We need to understand cost by 
I think we need to redefine service obligations 
to some extent. Insofar as the customer has alternatives, it is 
not c that we should have the utility on call at all times to 
serve the customer. We may need to have longer term contracts 
customers or standby charges. There are a whole range of 
alternat s ing with the fact that the customer has 
a s. We need to carefully scrutinize utility investment 
CHAIRWOr-IAN MOORE: Let me ask something. Do you 
1 the PUC the authority to do that with no further 
zation from the Legislature? 
MR. Y.JYSE: I don't know. We are looking at that. For 
term contracts is an area that may be gray. If you 
are intere I will your question back to the Legal 
s I am not a lawyer, and it is a good issue. 
CHAIRWO~~N MOORE: I would 1 that. 
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MR WYSE: I will do that. I the service 
is an important issue. I as large industry 
want to have choices, I can that. But then, it needs 
to flip of that, what obligation of the 
1 be limited. 
F ly, it is probably sirable to shift some of the 
re 
current 
and ri to the 1 The Commission's 
of ratemaking, reflects that. We want to have the 
1 and not just the core to have a strong stake 
outcome. Tthey must some direct f ial incentives to 
serve all markets as best they can. 
Tese are the main ro 
us. We have to manage dif 
changes, 
ro s We 
staff 
to procedurally more f 
they are big changes 












to a lot of help 
slature you particular, Ms. Moore. So, 




and ses a challenge for us. It's 
we ve to cope with it. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I 




you. I Ms. Wright jo 
sentations. It has been 
you're taking time from 
that, we will adjourn 
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a from a book 
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chapter I have 
are to discuss 
to the issues 
page 8 of 
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as part of an 
of which is 
s on social, 
is analogous 
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a pumpkin pie. In 
lato structure 
itions. The 
why this is 
ives 
rt of emerging 
t is more to the 
as, "What is the 
render serviCe?" 
one concept of a 
telecommunications monopoly. 
y in r of competitive 








4) A variation mi t 
cou give 
ises to ivate firms to 
ilities t are 
cing structures 
on standards set by 
f a ivate firm 
to transmiss es that are dif rent 
State oper transmission 
y in view of presently devel ing 
State should not interfere. If a private 
favorably wi State service 
be ter service, at lower rates, State 
a firm an rti amount of tax 
revenues based on usage and even surrender service to 
private enterprise on a renewable contract basis, 
subject to appropriate reviews. 
s stions take for gran a committment by the State 
oviding state of art telecommunications services to 








r issues arise relative to management and 
ch, although seem difficult 
miliar, are actua ly procedural and 
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